SDEA TRAINING • PART 3

Unexpected Situations – Test 05

Practice Unexpected Situations – Test 05 through three operational scenarios. Listen carefully, report what you heard, answer the examiner’s questions, and compare the three situations at the end.

05

TEST

3

SITUATIONS

✓

FINAL COMPARISON

TEST STRUCTURE

Complete the three situations step by step

This test contains three different operational situations. Listen carefully to each pilot–ATC communication, report what you heard, answer the examiner’s question, and complete the final comparison after the three situations.

01

Listen and report

Listen carefully to the pilot–ATC communication and report everything you heard, including the relevant operational details.

02

Answer the question

Listen to the examiner’s question and provide a clear, organized and well-supported response

03

Complete the final comparison

After listening to all three situations, compare them in terms of severity, possible solutions and ways of prevention.

TEST 05

Complete the three situations

SDEA PART 3

Part 3 Instructions

Listen carefully to the examiner's instructions before starting the three unexpected situations.

Examiner Part 3 Instructions
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Examiner

Part Three: “Unexpected Situations”. In this part of the test, you will listen to three different communications between pilots and air traffic controllers.

The recordings will be played twice. There is a five-second pause before the recording is repeated. After listening to the recording, you should tell me everything that the pilot and the controller said. I will then ask you a question.

At the end of Part Three, I will ask you to compare the three situations, so please take notes. All information is important. Do you have any questions?

UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS · SDEA PART 3

Situation 1

Listen carefully to the communication, report what you heard, and then answer the examiner's question.

Pilot ↔ ATC Operational Exchange
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PILOT

Phoenix Approach, looks like we’re gonna be [returning to the airport]. We’ve got an [airspeed indicator failure] that we’re gonna need to check, Copa 341.

ATC

Copa 341, roger. [Descend to one zero thousand], [altimeter setting two niner niner two], [expect vectors to ILS runway zero seven left].

Examiner Report What You Heard
Tell me everything you heard, please.
Suggested Report ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Report · ICAO 4

According to the exchange, the pilot said that they were returning to the airport because they had an airspeed indicator failure that they needed to check (look into).

Then, the controller instructed the crew to descend to 10,000 feet, provided the altimeter setting 29.92, and told them to expect vectors to the ILS approach for runway 07L.

Suggested Report ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Report · ICAO 5

According to the communication, the pilot let Phoenix Approach know (informed Phoenix Approach) that they were going back to the airport because an airspeed indicator had failed and they needed to look into (investigate) the problem.

In response, ATC told the crew to come down to (descend to) 10,000 feet, passed on (provided) the altimeter setting 29.92, and said they could expect vectors to the ILS approach for runway 07L.

Examiner Examiner Question
How dangerous is it when a pilot doesn’t know his correct airspeed?
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Suggested Answer ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 4

In my view, it can be very dangerous because the crew may not know if the aircraft is flying too fast or too slow, especially during approach and landing.

They can identify the problem by checking (looking at) the other airspeed indications, comparing the instruments, and following (going through) the unreliable airspeed procedure.

Suggested Answer ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 5

From a safety perspective, losing reliable airspeed information can be extremely serious because the crew could end up (eventually be) flying too fast or too slow and might even get close to (approach) a stall or an overspeed condition.

To work out (determine) which indication is wrong, they can cross-check the available instruments, fall back on (rely on) known pitch-and-power settings, and carry out (perform) the unreliable airspeed procedure.

UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS · SDEA PART 3

Situation 2

Listen carefully to the communication, report what you heard, and then answer the examiner's question.

Pilot ↔ ATC Operational Exchange
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PILOT

Brasilia Center, PT-WSW, we are on [heading three five zero], [climbing to flight level three six zero]. [We have just lost our GPS information]. [Our iPad is also inoperative]. [Unable to inform estimated time over Alfa Tango Fox VOR].

ATC

PT-WSW, Brasilia Center. Roger. [Resume conventional navigation]. [Fly radial three five five Brasilia VOR] [for eight zero nautical miles] then fly direct to Alpha Tango Fox.

Examiner Report What You Heard
Tell me everything you heard, please.
Suggested Report ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Report · ICAO 4

According to the exchange, the pilot reported that they were on heading 350 and climbing to Flight Level 360. He said that they had lost their GPS information, that the iPad was also inoperative, and that they were unable to provide (pass on) the estimated time over Alfa Tango Fox VOR.

Then, the controller instructed the crew to resume conventional navigation, fly radial 355 from Brasilia VOR for 80 nautical miles, and then proceed direct to Alfa Tango Fox.

Suggested Report ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Report · ICAO 5

According to the communication, the pilot let Brasilia Center know (informed Brasilia Center) that they were maintaining heading 350 and climbing to Flight Level 360. He added that they had lost GPS information, their iPad had also gone down (become inoperative), and they could not work out (determine) the estimated time over Alfa Tango Fox VOR.

In response, ATC told the crew to fall back on (use) conventional navigation, track radial 355 from Brasilia VOR for 80 nautical miles, and then go direct to Alfa Tango Fox.

Examiner Examiner Question
In your opinion, is GPS a completely reliable means of navigation? Why? Why not?
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Suggested Answer ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 4

In my opinion, GPS is very reliable, but it is not completely reliable because the signal can be lost, blocked, or affected by technical problems. That is why pilots should be able to use conventional navigation as a backup (fall back on conventional navigation).

Without GPS, air traffic management would still be possible, but it would probably be less efficient and require more ATC coordination.

Suggested Answer ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 5

From an operational point of view, GPS is highly reliable, but crews should never depend on it completely because the signal can drop out (be lost), be interfered with, or become unavailable.

If that happens, pilots need to fall back on (use) conventional navigation and work with (coordinate with) ATC. Without GPS, today’s air traffic system could still operate, but managing traffic would be more difficult, less efficient, and would place a greater workload on controllers and crews.

UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS · SDEA PART 3

Situation 3

Listen carefully to the communication, report what you heard, and then answer the examiner's question.

Pilot ↔ ATC Operational Exchange
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PILOT

Frankfurt Center, Lufthansa 2EL. We have [partial control of the aileron]. [Hydraulic pressure indication is dropping]. [We need to perform an emergency landing] at Frankfurt Airport.

ATC

Lufthansa 2EL, Frankfurt Center. [Descend at your discretion until three thousand feet]. [Runway two five right is available]. [Runway length is two thousand eight hundred meters]. [Confirm if it is adequate].

Examiner Report What You Heard
Tell me everything you heard, please.
Suggested Report ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Report · ICAO 4

According to the exchange, the pilot reported that they had partial control of the aileron and that the hydraulic pressure indication was dropping. He also said that they needed to perform (carry out) an emergency landing at Frankfurt Airport.

Then, the controller instructed the crew to descend at their discretion until 3,000 feet. He informed them that runway 25R was available, said that it was 2,800 meters long, and asked them to confirm whether it was adequate.

Suggested Report ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Report · ICAO 5

According to the communication, the pilot let Frankfurt Center know (informed Frankfurt Center) that they had only partial control of the aileron and that the hydraulic pressure was dropping off (decreasing). He added that they needed to get the aircraft down (land the aircraft) at Frankfurt Airport.

In response, ATC told the crew to come down to (descend to) 3,000 feet at their discretion, pointed out (stated) that runway 25R was available, passed on (provided) that it was 2,800 meters long, and asked them to confirm whether that would work for them (be adequate).

Examiner Examiner Question
When do pilots need to land on longer runways?
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Suggested Answer ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 4

In general, pilots may need a longer runway when the aircraft is heavy, the runway is wet or contaminated, the braking action is poor, or a technical problem increases the landing distance.

In a situation like this, ATC may also allow the crew to descend at their discretion, which means the pilots can decide when to start the descent while respecting the cleared altitude.

Suggested Answer ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Answer · ICAO 5

From an operational standpoint, crews may need a longer runway whenever something makes it harder to slow down (decelerate) after touchdown, such as an overweight landing, poor braking action, a contaminated runway, or a system failure that increases approach speed.

A hydraulic or flight-control problem could also make the aircraft use up (require) more runway. In that case, ATC may let the crew come down (descend) at their discretion, meaning they can work out (decide) when to start the descent while staying within the cleared altitude.

UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS · SDEA PART 3

Final Comparison

Compare the three situations in terms of severity, possible solutions, and ways of prevention, and explain which one would be the most difficult to deal with.

Examiner Final Comparison
Now, after listening to these three situations: How would you compare them, which one do you think is the most difficult to deal with and why? You may want to compare them in terms of severity, possible solutions or ways of prevention.
Suggested Comparison ICAO Level 4
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Suggested Comparison · ICAO 4

In my view, the hydraulic and flight-control problem was more critical than the other two situations because the crew had only partial control of the aileron and needed an emergency landing. The airspeed indicator failure was also serious because incorrect speed information could affect aircraft control, but the crew could compare the instruments and follow (go through) the appropriate procedure.

By comparison, the loss of GPS was less dangerous because conventional navigation was still available. Overall, the hydraulic problem was the most difficult to deal with because it directly affected the aircraft’s controllability.

Suggested Comparison ICAO Level 5
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Suggested Comparison · ICAO 5

From an operational standpoint, the hydraulic and flight-control failure was the most critical of the three because the crew was dealing with (managing) reduced aircraft control and had to get the aircraft down (land the aircraft) safely. The unreliable airspeed situation was also more serious than the GPS failure because incorrect speed information could lead to a stall or an overspeed, although the crew could cross-check the instruments and fall back on (rely on) known pitch-and-power settings.

By comparison, losing GPS was easier to work around (manage) because the pilots could switch over to (use) conventional navigation and work with (coordinate with) ATC. Overall, the hydraulic problem would be the hardest to deal with because there were fewer ways to make up for (compensate for) the loss of flight-control capability.

Optional Follow-up If Asked About Your Experience
Have you ever been in or through a similar situation?
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Suggested Personal Experience Answer

I’ve never experienced any of these situations personally. However, I’ve trained for abnormal and emergency situations, so I understand how important quick decision-making, clear communication, and situational awareness can be.

SDEA · PART 3 COMPLETE

End of Part 3

You have completed the Unexpected Situations section. Listen to the examiner and choose what you would like to do next.

Examiner Closing Message
Thank you! This is the end of part three. Let’s now move on to the last part of the test, part four.
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